In a cap-and-trade system, a power plant operator can choose to operate while paying for the necessary emissions allowances, retrofit emissions controls to the plant, or replace the unit with a new plant. Allowance prices are uncertain, as are the timing and stringency of requirements for control of mercury and carbon emissions. We model the evolution of allowance prices for SO 2 , NO x , Hg, and CO 2 using geometric Brownian motion with drift, volatility, and jumps, and use an options-based analysis to find the value of the alternatives. In the absence of a carbon price, only if the owners have a planning horizon longer than 30 years would they replace a conventional coal-fired plant with a high-performance unit like a supercritical plant; otherwise, they would install SO 2 and NO x controls on the existing unit. An expectation that the CO 2 price will reach $50/tonne in 2020 makes IGCC with carbon capture and sequestration attractive today even for planning horizons as short as 20 years. A carbon price below $40/tonne is unlikely to produce investments in carbon capture for electric power.
Introduction
Electric power generation firms in the United States must make decisions affecting their 645 existing coal-fired plants in an atmosphere of regulatory uncertainty [1, 2] . SO 2 , NO x , and mercury controls may require retrofits or allowance purchases. The U.S. may put a value on carbon in the future, perhaps via a cap-and-trade system. If prices of tradable allowances are high over the life of a plant, they may provide an incentive to consider capital investments to reduce emissions.
Recent work by Sekar et al. [3] found that a CO 2 price of at least $28 ± 5 per metric ton (tonne) is required to justify investment in integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) generation plants. Bergerson and Lave [4] find that a price of approximately $30 per tonne is required before the cost of electricity from IGCC+CCS plants is lower than that from a conventional pulverized coal (PC) plant. These two are greenfield analyses, considering decisions for new plants. Reinelt and Keith [2] find that significant replacements of existing plants with IGCC with carbon capture and sequestration (IGCC+CCS) does not occur at CO 2 prices less than about $50 per tonne.
Here we consider the firm-level decision to buy allowances for an existing plant, retrofit the plant with emissions controls, or build a new plant with emissions control technology. We model the evolution of allowance prices for SO 2 , NO x , Hg, and CO 2 using geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with drift, volatility, and jumps.
We analyze the profitability of investments in controls for emissions that may have an allowance price in the future (Hg and CO 2 τ : time it takes to complete the installation of the ECD υ : time it takes to complete the future installation of an ECD on top of another (e.g. time to install CCS on an existent SCPC) ω : stochastic process followed by the allowance prices. Also denoted as t pollutant ω (e.g. 2 SO ω ) t X : exercise price of the call option. Price that has to be paid (per unit of emissions removed) to exercise the option of using the ECD and reduce emissions
Valuing emissions control devices as options
An emissions control device (ECD) may be an optimal investment even if the expected value of compliance cost via allowances is lower than the expected compliance cost with the ECD, since the ECD investment can be valued as an insurance contract against high allowances prices (this approach is different from the "real options" approach of [5] implemented by [6] and [7] in which the risk of making an irreversible investment is considered to be higher than the risk of relying in allowances with highly volatile prices. Because a shortage of allowances is plausible and the time to build a control might be significant, there is value in hedging against potentially high allowance prices)
If the ECD can be installed and then turned on and off as desired (units generally have bypass equipment that allows the flue gas to completely bypass the ECD and 6 therefore are "flexible"), then in every period the plant operator has the option of deciding whether to operate the ECD and reduce air emissions or to buy the corresponding allowances in the market. In this sense, the ECD can be seen as an "allowances-producing machine" and can be valued as such using the analogy of call options. Turning on the scrubber will have the same practical effect as buying allowances at the O&M cost per unit of pollutant removed, making the installation of the ECD analogous to engaging in a transaction that gives the investor the right, but not the obligation, to buy a quantity of allowances at a specified price at different time periods.
The price "paid" per "allowance" ("strike price" in finance parlance) is the per unit variable operating and maintenance cost of the ECD t X (See Notation section.)
Whenever the capital cost of the ECD is exceeded by the value of these call options, the investment should be made.
In this context "exercising the option" means using the ECD. If the expected lifetime of the ECD is T , and the expected generated allowances at time t are t N , then installing the ECD is equivalent to getting 1 N call options (on allowances) that will expire at time t =1, 2 N call options that will expire at time t =2, and T N call options that will expire at time t =T. The number of allowances t N that can be "obtained" at time t cannot be more than the initial emissions at time t times the removal efficiency of the control. Because we cannot change the throughput of the power plant, the option to abate 2 N units of pollutant can be exercised only at t =2 and not earlier or later. In this sense the options obtained by the installation of the ECD are equivalent to European call options (options that can be exercised only on the expiration date).
Because before the ECD is ready to operate, there will be no emissions reductions and therefore no "options" to "buy allowances" will be obtained, the present value of installing an ECD with an installation time of τ is given by:
If the stochastic process followed by allowance prices ω can be assumed to be GBM (see [8] for an introduction to Wiener processes and GBM) then (1) can be solved using the formula of [9] , which is a special case of those presented in [10] and [11] (See section 1.1. of the supporting material).
If operating the ECD reduces emissions of more than one pollutant at the same time (for example a WFGD which reduces simultaneously SO 2 and Hg emissions), ω refers to the stochastic process followed by the price of one unit of a basket that contains allowances for the pollutants abated, as discussed in section 1.2 of the supporting material. For the ECDs that reduce emissions of pollutants whose prices are assumed to follow GBM and experience a jump at a time j to a price j A and a change in the GBM parameters (1) is transformed to:
Therefore (1) and (1b) (along with assumptions about the time varying process followed by allowances prices) are useful to quantify the benefits associated to the stream of call options (on allowances or baskets of allowances) obtained with the installation of an ECD. If there are no additional benefits, then a simple comparison between these and the capital costs of the ECD will be enough to determine the value of the investment.
The replacement decision
An older coal-fired power plant might be replaced with a new integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) or supercritical pulverized coal (SCPC) generating plant that reduces emissions of SO 2 , NO x , mercury, and CO 2 and will allow savings in fuel and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs. To find the value of investing in a new plant or in a retrofit it is necessary to sum the payoffs associated with fuel and other O&M costs, as well as with the SO 2 , NO x , mercury, and CO 2 emissions reductions. The payoff associated with each commodity can be calculated using an "options" or "basket option" (introduced above) or using a "forward contract", "compound option", or "disjunctive option" analogy as presented below.
Forward contract analogy:
When there is no flexibility to stop reducing emissions a "forward contract" analogy is useful. Even if the ECDs in an SCPC plant are turned off, there are still emissions reductions (relative to the baseline plant) that occur because of improved efficiency. Similarly, for the IGCC the reductions of SO 2 , NO x and mercury emissions are not a decision variable and therefore we cannot use the analogy of call options to value those benefits. Obtaining a constant reduction of emissions is equivalent to having a bundle of forward contracts to purchase allowances for every year the generator is online. Thus, the installation of an IGCC unit is equivalent to buying a forward contract for SO 2 , NO x , and mercury allowances. Installation of an SCPC gives both call options and forward contracts. 
Compound option analogy:
The installation of a WFGD allows the subsequent installation of a SCR and postcombustion amine-based CCS; the installation of a SCR allows the subsequent installation of a WFGD or a WFGD+CCS; and the installation of a SCPC or an IGCC allows the subsequent installation of CCS [13] .
The option to install an ECD in the future can be seen as a "compound option" Both for pre-combustion and post-combustion CCS systems it is necessary to remove the SO 2 from the flue gas before capturing the CO 2 . This implies that the option to operate the CCS to achieve CO 2 reductions comes together with the "obligation" to reduce SO 2 emissions. Because the CCS cannot be operated without operating the WFGD but the WFGD can be operated without operating the CCS, having CCS in a pulverized coal plant presents a set of 3 mutually exclusive or "disjunctive" options: a) to operate the 
Considering different IGCC configurations
For a newly installed SCPC, the costs of later adding CCS are not significantly larger than the costs of adding the CCS at the time of installation of the plant, provided that the plant is designed with that in mind. For an IGCC this may not be the case.
Combustion turbines in a power plant are designed according to the quantity and characteristics of the fuel used. In an SCPC the CCS is a post-combustion system and 11 there are no changes in the conditions of the combustion component of the plant. In an IGCC, the CO 2 is removed from the flue gas prior to the combustion and therefore the specifications for the combustion system of an IGCC with CCS differ significantly from those of an IGCC without a CCS. An investor that today builds an IGCC thinking that in the future it may be necessary to install a CCS system has two alternatives: 1) install an IGCC that operates optimally without a CCS and, later on when the CCS is installed, to change major components in the plant (probably changing the combustion turbines) and 2) install an IGCC that would operate optimally if it had a CCS system in place but that is suboptimal compared to 1) when it is operated before the CCS is installed. Alternative 2)
can be labeled as "capture ready" and implies larger capital costs and O&M costs than 1) but lower CCS retrofit costs. In our analysis below we consider both alternatives.
Install an emissions control device, or replace the plant?
We have computed the value of nine potential investments in a plant similar to the Table 1 describes a scenario for allowances prices without carbon dioxide regulation (see section 1.3 of the supporting material for more information on the scenarios and section 4 for the corresponding 95% confidence intervals). We model a large jump in SO 2 price, and two jumps in mercury price. The carbon price remains at zero. Table 1 : Base case scenario: Parameters of the process followed by allowances prices in year 2007 dollars. SO 2 and NO x allowances are given in short tons, Hg allowances are given in pounds and CO 2 allowances are given in tones. Table 1 (no carbon price)
3P cap-and-trade
CO2 0 0 0 - - - - - - - -
4P cap-and-trade
Suppose a firm expects a cap-and-trade program for CO 2 to begin in 2025 at an allowance price of $20/tonne and expects prices to evolve according to GBM with a low 14 volatility of 0.05 and a drift of 0.04 (scenario 2, Table 2 ). The allowance prices for SO 2 , NO x , and Hg are the same as those considered in the base case scenario (Table 1) .
Alternative scenario for CO2 With the initial low CO 2 allowance price and low volatility, the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval price never exceeds $35/tonne (supporting materials, section 4). While the IGCC plant is a somewhat more valuable investment than in the scenario with no carbon price, it is not a favorable investment. Replacing the old plant with an SCPC is better than retrofitting the old plant with ECDs only for planning horizons of 26 years or more. The carbon price is never high enough for SCPC+CCS to be more favorable than an SCPC without CCS.
We next consider the introduction of a $10/tonne carbon price in 2010 (scenario 3, Table 2 ), one plausible outcome of the current U.S. political process. As shown in 
Non-4P decision making criteria
The above analysis indicates that replacing the plant is slightly favored (with no or low carbon price) or significantly favored (with a $40/ton carbon price) over retrofitting for planning horizons longer than 23 years, yet the predominant strategy in today's industry is to retrofit with WFGD and SCRs. We now consider factors that may explain the preference for retrofits.
The efficiency advantage of supercritical plants over PC plants is important only if coal prices increase relative to the sales price of electricity. We re-ran the analysis of supporting materials, section 6) from the 26 years shown in figure 2 . Thus, if a firm believes that coal prices will be stable, it is more likely to install a WFGD or SCR than to replace the plant with a supercritical unit.
The previous analyses are based on IECM model capital costs and on the assumption that new SCPC and IGCC units can operate at a capacity factor of 83%, which seems reasonable estimate considering reliability of SCPC in Japan is higher than (98%) [15] and reliability (including planned and unplanned outages) of two operating IGCC plants for which we have data (Wabash and PuertoLlano) is higher than 85% [16] .
However, because the IGCC and the SCPC technologies are less proven than a conventional PC, investors might perceive higher uncertainty in its reliability. Instead of trying to account for this in the valuation equations (which assume known electrical output and known emissions reductions), we analyze what would happen if investors added a "risk-premium" to the capital costs of installing a new plant. This "riskpremium" can also account for the possibility that future capital costs of these new technologies might be lower in the future due to learning [17] ). We find that if investors add a 25% risk premium for SCPC and IGCC plants, a retrofit is favored for virtually all planning horizons (less than 44 years) with no CO 2 price, and for planning horizons as long as 32 years with a CO 2 price of $20/ton in 2025 (section 7 of supporting materials).
Effects of timing and magnitude of CO 2 allowance price changes
To examine the effects of investors' perceptions of the future of CO 2 prices on investment decisions, we examined scenarios in which prices jump once to prices between $10/tonne to $58/tonne, (the highest price observed in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme during the period 4/22/05-10/31/06 [18] ) assuming the volatility is 5%
and the drift 4%. Table 1 and Table 2 become zero); the region in which SCPC is favored is reduced and the WFGD region is enlarged in this case. 
Discussion
We have used options analogies to value the benefits of different investments.
One advantage of this approach is that if we assume a cap-and-trade system and GBM for allowance prices, the benefits (that depend on uncertain quantities) can be valued with a formula that has a closed-form solution (McDonald-Siegel formula). The use of stochastic dynamic optimization that accounted for uncertainty and managerial flexibility is a feasible extension of this approach that we believe should give similar results.
The optimality of the replace or retrofit decision depends heavily on the planning horizon and the timing and stringency of the cost of carbon dioxide (as well as on expectations for fuel and 3P allowance costs). If the owner of an existing pulverized coal plant without emission controls expects that CO 2 emissions will not be penalized, the higher efficiency of a supercritical plant is not sufficient to favor its installation over installing a WGFD or SCR on the existing plant unless the owner has a planning horizon of 32 years or longer.
A $10/tonne CO 2 price expected even as early as 2010 is not a sufficient incentive to change the investment decision from retrofit to replacement for firms with a planning horizon less than 23 years. A $20/tonne price (unless very early) is likely to provide insufficient incentive to replace rather than to retrofit, particularly if investors believe that the capital cost of a new SCPC or IGCC carries a substantial risk premium.
If the owner expects a $40/tonne carbon price in 2025 or earlier, replacing the plant with an IGCC+CCS unit is favored except by firms with planning horizons shorter than 29 years.
Once old and inefficient plants are retrofitted with equipment to abate SO 2 and NO x they will continue to be a source of significant CO 2 emission for decades. Unless policies are enacted that raise the CO 2 carbon price to ~$40/ton, the power system (already responsible for 40% of CO 2 emissions in the U.S.) is likely to follow a path of high emissions and/or higher costs of abatement.
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The option to buy one allowance
A common assumption about stock prices that facilitates enormously the calculation of the value of financial options is that they follow Geometric Brownian Motion § (GBM), that is that at each point in time, the log of the stock price t A follows a normal distribution or equivalently that the stock price follows a log-normal distribution (See [1] for an introduction to Wiener processes and GBM). This assumption is consistent with the Hypothesis of Efficient Markets assumed to hold for stock markets: current prices are the best estimate of future prices.
Because both SO2 and NOx allowances markets involve many participants and transactions ( [2, 3] ), and have now become more active with futures traded for as far as 2010, it is fair to say that the assumption of GBM for SO2 and NOx allowances prices is at least in principle acceptable. We can say the same for CO2 and Hg allowances. ( ) ( )
where 0 A is the price of allowances at time 0, t X the exercise price (or ECD's variable O&M cost per ton of pollutant abated at time t), ( ) x Φ the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard-normal distribution, r the risk-free rate, and σ the volatility of the process that describes allowance prices. The parameter δ called the "payout rate" or "return shortfall" is given by 
The "basket options" analogy
Besides reducing SO2 emissions, the operation of a WFGD reduces mercury emissions. For the plant analyzed in this paper the operation of the WFGD causes a reduction of 431 lbs mercury per year. Therefore the installation of the WFGD gives the option of getting simultaneously in a "basket" both SO2 and mercury "allowances" at a price equal to the OM cost of the WFGD. We can treat the "basket" of allowances as a single underlying asset and apply the same reasoning as before to value the investment. The payoff of the investment is then given by Equation 1 in the paper, but in this case the call option is on a basket that contains one SO2 allowance and 2.9206e-3 allowances of mercury ‡ ‡ .
The stochastic process followed by t B is also assumed to be GBM with parameters estimated from the simulation of several uncorrelated observations of both SO2 and mercury allowances. The final drift and volatility estimates are obtained from the average of the drift and volatility obtained for each series. ** The assumption here is that there is a dynamic portfolio of assets whose price is perfectly correlated to At. Although the random variable that results from adding two lognormal random variables does not have a lognormal distribution it is common to assume so, because it has been shown that the practical consequences of this imprecision are negligible § § .
Characterizing the uncertainty in allowances prices: GBM with jumps
The assumption of GBM with constant drift and volatility for a long period of time can be difficult to justify for allowance prices. Regulations changes and other factors can have a noticeable effect in the price of allowances causing sudden up or down movements in the prices which implies that we can think of the long-term process of allowance prices as a GBM with jumps in which the parameters might change.
Here we characterize the uncertainty on prices specifying scenarios in which prices jump from one GBM process to another at a known time. We use information about upcoming regulation changes and future prices to set the timing of the jumps, their size, and the drift parameters for the GBM processes of each sub period. To calculate the δ parameter we assume
For characterizing the jumps and estimating the drifts of SO2 and Hg allowance prices we use the forecast of the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) [6] which is based on information about unit's retirements and installations of abatement equipment. The process for prices of CO2 will be informed by observed prices in the EU ETS.
The AEO 2006 [6] forecasts indicate that SO2 allowance prices will rise to nearly $890 per ton in 2015 and will remain between $880 and $980 per ton from 2015 through 2030 *** . For SO2 allowances we assume a starting price of $539 which is the closing price on October 31 2006 † † † . We also assume that SO2 allowances follow a GBM process with a volatility equal to the one observed in the 30 months of historical data from 03/15/04 to 10/31/06, and a drift that reflects the trend that would allow prices to evolve from $539 to the value forecast by AEO We assume the price of mercury allowances follows the AEO 2006 forecast, that is mercury allowances jump to a price of $23,400 /lb in 2010 (2004 dollars) and follow a § § It is common to assume that indexes of stocks follow GBM even though it is also assumed that stocks prices follow GBM. *** AEO 2006 page 104. We assume figures are given in 2004 dollars, as is the case throughout the report.
† † † We choose to assume a GBM with drift and volatility given by the estimates from a long historical data series (the last 30 months) because the "options" we are valuing are long lived. If we expect the price process of allowances to start at a current price of 0 A and evolve according to ) , ( σ μ
GBM
and then at year j T to jump to a price process for which the current price would be j A and continues evolving according to ) , ( ∫ ∫
Costs and performance of alternative technologies
The operational characteristics of the baseline plant and the capital and OM costs of emissions controls and replacement plants shown in Table 4 **** have been obtained from the Integrated Environmental Control Model-Carbon Sequestration Edition (IECM-cs), version 5.1.3(c) [7] † † † † , assuming that the extra-costs of installing add-on equipment after the plant has been built (retrofitting) are as given in Table 3 . (see [8] . § § § Note that in this case, we are specifying two different price processes that have different initial values and parameters. The jump is from one of these price processes to the other. Expressing the jump in this way allows us to calculate the value of the option today, and discounting is not necessary. Also expressing the mark-up price A j as a price in today's dollars facilitates the interpretation of different scenarios. **** The gross-electrical-output, the capacity factor, and the types of installed environmental controls are inputs in the IECM model, while emissions and costs are outputs. We have chosen a type of coal for which resulting emissions of the baseline plant match reported numbers for Hatfield on the EGRID database (EPA, U. S. Availability of the new plants is assumed to be 83%, and the nameplate capacity is selected so the electricity generation is roughly the same as the one generated by the original plant. We assume that there are no extra costs in delaying the installation of the CCS system on the IGCC "capture ready" plant. Table 4 and Table 6 : Assumptions about electricity price, coal price, and OM costs
Investment value of each alternative
The investment value of each alternative is equal to the present value of the benefits minus the capital cost. As mentioned before, the benefits are related to any current or potential emissions reductions (after accounting for the corresponding OM costs and energy penalties), and savings in OM, fuel and extra electricity generated with respect to the original plant and are valued as a sum of several terms that include the forward contract or option valuation formulas (call, on a basket, disjunctive, compound) that better represent the operational characteristics of the technology. Tables 5 and 6 show how the benefits of each technology can be valued. For example, the value of the benefits of a WFGD is equal to:
Equation 5 the benefits associated to NOx correspond to the value of the compound option of subsequently installing a SCR and getting NOx allowances at a cost equal to the OM of the SCR plus its energy penalty. The benefits associated to Basket1 correspond to the value of a stream of call options on a Basket that contains SO2 and Hg allowances. The benefits associated to Disjunctive(Basket1,Basket2) correspond to the option of installing a CCS system and being able to choose to operate it or not to obtain call options on Basket1 or Basket2 (with SO2, Hg and CO2 allowances). The installation of the WFGD does not reduce the use of coal with respect to the original plant, nor reduces the other O&M costs, nor produces extra electricity that can be sold. We do not include the benefits associated with a reduction in particulate matter (PM) because there is no associated market mechanism. For an analysis that accounts for the social costs of PM emissions see [9] Table 1 describes the baseline scenarios for allowances prices as they have been described in section 1.3 and Figure 6 shows the corresponding 95 th -confidence intervals. Table 9 : Base case scenario: Parameters of process followed by allowances prices Figure 7 shows the median and the 95 % confidence interval for CO2 allowance prices under the scenario described in Table 2 . Table 1 in paper (no carbon price), and capital costs of SC, SC+CCS, IGCC, IGCC capture ready and IGCC+CCS are 25% higher. Table 2 in paper (CO 2 price jumps to $20/tonne in 2025) and capital costs of SC, SC+CCS, IGCC, IGCC capture ready and IGCC+CCS are 25% higher.
